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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC.,
PlaintiffAppellant,

:

Docket No, 900529-CA

:

Oral Argument
Priority No. 16

vs.
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation,
DefendantAppellee,

:
JURISDICTION

The judgment appealed was a final judgment of the Fourth
Circuit Court for Utah County, Orem Department, dated January 3,
1991.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1990).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the appellant waive the right to raise the issues

concerning formation of a contract under the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (1990), by conceding in the lower court that
it was not suing on a written

agreement

and by

limiting

its

argument in the lower court to issues relating to partial performance?

This issue was not raised in the lower court and no

standard of review is applicable.

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938,

945 (Utah 1987) ; Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).
2.

Has the appellant failed to marshal the evidence and

demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the
lower court's finding that appellee did not waive the ten-day time

limit for acceptance of its "Cost Estimate?"

The standard of

review is whether there is competent evidence to sustain the lower
court's findings.

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808

P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991).
3.

Does the Uniform Commercial Code in any way restrict the

right of a contracting party to specifically limit the time within
which acceptance of an offer must occur?
review for correctness.

This issue is subject to

Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist.

No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
4.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207

contract has not been admitted?
for correctness.

(199 0) apply where a

This issue is subject to review

Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.

Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
5.

Where the lower court made no findings concerning breach

of a contract or damages because no contract was found to exist,
should the case be referred back to the trial court in the event
the appellate court finds that a contract was formed?

Fossell v.

Department of Commerce, 165 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 26 (Ct. Ap. 1991).
6.

Is the appellee entitled to an award of costs and fees

pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure?
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d

365

(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughn v.

Mauqhn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statutes in this case are as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (1990).
2

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 (1990).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-205 (1990).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-206 (1990).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (1990).
Copies are attached in Appendix "G" to this brief.
STATEMENT OP CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil case involving a dispute over formation of a
contract to supply building components to an elementary school.
This case touches a sore spot with suppliers and subcontractors:
general contractors who shop bids and who do not give timely notice
of bid acceptance so costs can be fixed.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

On or about June 5, 1984, the plaintiff filed a complaint in
the Second District Court for Weber County alleging a single cause
of action for breach of contract against the defendant.

Plaintiff

claimed that there was a contract for the defendant to supply roof
trusses to an elementary school in Weber County at a specified
price and terms. (R. 17-19.) The defendant filed a motion for a
change of venue to Utah County. (R. 4-12.) The plaintiff stipulated
to the change of venue. (R. 1-2). The defendant thereafter filed
an answer denying the existence of a contract and alleging, among
other defenses, that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the
statute of frauds, that plaintiff was estopped from asserting a
contract and that plaintiff had failed to mitigate its damages.
(R. 22-25)
3

Substantial initial discovery occurred at the outset of the
case.

(R. 27, 30 and 31.) The case thereafter

Quintek

filed two separate motions to dismiss

languished

and

for failure

to

prosecute, on October 3, 1986 (R. 41) and again on March 14, 1990.
(R. 69.) Both of these motions were denied and the case went to
trial on August 13, 1990.
The court below issued its ruling dated September 10, 1990,
in favor of the defendant Quintek.

(R. 151-152, Appendix

lf

D.n)

Defendant had, prior to the lower court , s ruling, submitted its
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 158-162.) On
October 10, 1990, the appellant, Herm Hughes, through its new
counsel, filed a notice of appeal, even though no judgment had yet
been entered. (R. 167.) On October 31, 1990, Herm Hughes filed its
objections to the findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed
by Quintek.

(R. 188-203.) On December 5, 1990, the lower court

received oral arguments from counsel on the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and on January 3, 1990, the lower entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 228-232, Appendix "E")
and its Judgment (R. 221-222, Appendix " F " ) .

Herm Hughes has since

pursued its appeal pursuant to the previously filed notice.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc.
tractor.
trusses.

(R. 231.)

(Herm Hughes) is a general con-

Quintek is a manufacturer of wooden roof

Quintek does not install the trusses or do work on the

job site; it just sells trusses and delivers them to the project.
(R. 231.)
4

In October, 1983, Herm Hughes bid on the Midland Elementary
School in Roy, Utah, for the Weber County School District.
231.)

(R.

A bid service operated by the Intermountain Contractor (a

trade publication) advertised the project, and Herm Hughes received
bids from several truss suppliers to furnish the roof trusses.
231.)

One of the bids was from Quintek.

(R.

(R. 231.)

Quintek's bid proposal for the Midland Elementary School was
verbally

communicated

telephone.

to Herm Hughes

on October

Quintek then followed up the telephone call with a

written bid proposal titled as "Cost Estimate."
Exh. 27.)

25, 1983, by

(R. 231, Exh. 6,

The "Cost Estimate" (Appendix "A" hereto) specifically

required acceptance thereof within ten days.

Quintek's offer was

not accepted within the ten-day period and was never signed and
returned to Quintek.

(R. 231, T. 87-88).

Quintek expected notice

of acceptance of their bid on the day the bids were opened or
shortly thereafter. (T. 134-135)
While Quintek did not receive any notice or communication from
Herm Hughes following the bid opening, Quintek did hear from Mr.
Larry Gilson, an engineer for one of their competitors, Oscar E.
Chytraus Company.

Mr. Gilson related that a week or two after the

bid opening on the project in question, Herm Hughes invited him to
come to its office to talk about the Chytraus bid.

(T. 117-123.)

The Chytraus Company's bid was the low bid on the dollar amount,
but it included a discount of only five percent. (T. 122.)

Mr.

Gilson interpreted Herm Hughes' inquiries as bid shopping and told

5

Quintek about it.

(R. 230.)

Mr. Gilson declined to alter the

Chytraus bid.
On or about November 30, 1983, Quintek received from Herm
Hughes a "Supplier Agreement."
hereto.)
29, 1983.

(Exhibit "11" and Appendix "B"

The "Supplier Agreement" was sent to Quintek on November
(R. 231, T. 87-88, Exh. 9, Exh. 20.) Herm Hughes made

it clear to Mr. Boyd Jacobson, president of Quintek, that Quintek
had to agree to the terms of the Supplier Agreement if it was going
to get the job. (T. 128).
A more detailed agreement was expected to follow acceptance
of Quintek's offer ("Cost Estimate") Quintek expected both a timely
acceptance of the bid proposal and a "purchase order." (T. 141.)
After receiving the Supplier Agreement, Mr. Jacobson, president of
Quintek, rejected the same on the basis that he could not agree
with the additional terms contained therein.

(T. 129-131.) In

particular, Mr. Jacobson objected to the part of Section 1 that
obligated Quintek to Herm Hughes for the obligations Herm Hughes
owed to the owner.

(T. 145-146.)

He objected to the part of

Section 3 that allowed Herm Hughes to keep a ten percent retainage
and to other payment terms.

(T. 147.)

He also objected to the

liquidated damages provision of Section 4.

(T. 129.) Mr. Jacobson

voiced these objections to the "Supplier Agreement" to Todd Walker
and told Mr. Walker he wouldn't sign the supplier agreement.
130-131.)

(T.

The "Supplier Agreement" was never signed by Quintek.

(T. 38, 57, 130-131.) Quintek acted promptly and reasonably in
rejecting the supplier agreement. (R. 229)
6

Quintek made no lumber purchases for the job in question. (T.
132.) Quintek never began fabrication of any trusses for the job
in question. (T. 132-133.) Quintek never sent a bill to Herm Hughes
and was never paid any money by Herm Hughes. (T. 133)
Lumber is a commodity and the price of lumber is variable.
(T. 133.) The cost of lumber constituted 50% - 60% of the total bid
price for the trusses. (T. 133-134)
During the period December 1, 1983 to approximately February
8-9, 1984, the parties continued discussions about a possible
contract and continued to negotiate over the terms under which
Quintek would be willing to supply the trusses. This winter period
was a slow time for Quintek and it wanted to conclude an agreement
for the job in question. (T. 135.) During this period Quintek
submitted a single shop drawing to Herm Hughes on or about December
15, 1983.

(Exh. 13.)

The purpose in doing so was specifically

stated by Mr. Boyd in his testimony:
Q
(By Mr. Lambert) Mr. Jacobsen [sic], let
me ask you, given the background that you've
just told us concerning this contract, what
was the purpose of preparing shop drawings
during the period of negotiation?
A
Todd [Herm Hughes' project supervisor]
had asked me if we would begin preparing
drawings because I had — I had told Todd that
in order for us to perform on the contract in
a time [sic] manner that they were asking for,
that the shop drawings would have to be processed during the time of negotiations.
Later in February, Quintek prepared its own version of a
supplier agreement. (Exh. 19, Appendix "C")

This proposal was

submitted to Herm Hughes on or about February 22, 1984, and
7

contained a statement of reasons why the proposal presented thereby
stated an increased cost term. (T. 73, Exh. 19.) This proposal was
rejected by Herm Hughes. (T. 75.) This proposal, with the discount,
was lower than the bid ultimately accepted by Herm Hughes to supply
the truss in question.

(Exh. 24)

Herm Hughes commenced an action against Quintek for breach of
contract on June 5, 1984. (R. 17-19.) At the trial, which commenced
on August 13, 1990, counsel for the plaintiff conceded that it was
not suing on a written agreement, but argued that the issue to be
decided was whether there was part performance which would remove
the case from the ambit of the statute of frauds.

(T. 106-112)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I.

Plaintiff failed to raise the issues presented by

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (1990) at trial and is therefore now
precluded form raising these issues for the first time on appeal.
Point II. The court correctly found that there was no agreement formed between the parties and therefore no contract.

The

trial court did not articulate the specific standard of law it
applied in entering its judgment; however, it is not apparent nor
can it be shown that the court applied the "mirror image rule" from
the common law of contracts to the issues of offer and acceptance.
The

trial

court's

decision

is

sustainable

under

the

Uniform

Commercial Code. The trial court found that there was no agreement
between the parties under the Uniform Commercial Code.

The trial

court found that the alleged contract did not meet the prere8

quisites of the Uniform Commercial Code's statute of frauds and was
therefore not enforceable.

This court should affirm the decision

of the lower court where the findings of the court are not clearly
erroneous and the conclusions are sustainable under a legal ground
apparent on the record even when such law is not specifically
articulated by the trial court as the basis for its decision.
Because the trial court's decision is sustainable under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the trial court's decision should be affirmed.
Point III.

The trial court correctly found, as a matter of

law, that the supplier agreement was untimely because it came after
the 10-day acceptance period set forth in Quintek's bid proposal.
The court's decision is sustainable under the Uniform Commercial
Code which states that acceptance will be cut off by the deadline
stated in the offer. Plaintiff has not shown that the evidence was
insufficient to support trial court's finding of fact that Quintek
did not waive the 10-day acceptance requirement of his offer.
The court was correct in finding that there was not a waiver of the
deadline.
Point IV.

The trial court correctly found that the conduct

of the parties did not form an agreement or contract.

The findings

of fact adequately support a determination that the conduct did not
rise to such a level.
Point V.

Inequities would result if an offeror was to be held

to prices quoted under an expired offer where quotes were based
upon underlying quotes for material costs that had also expired.

9

Point VI.

Appellee should be awarded fees and costs because

the appeal is without merit and was taken without a reasonable
likelihood of success.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
HERM HUGHES FAILED TO ARGUE THE PROVISIONS OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-2 07 IN THE LOWER COURT
AND FAILED TO ARGUE WAIVER AND CANNOT NOW
RAISE THESE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL.
At trial Quintek raised as a defense that Herm Hughes's claims
were barred by the statute of frauds contained

in the Uniform

Commercial Code enacted as Utah Code Ann. (R. 8, 9, 12.)

Herm

Hughes did not argue any aspects of the Uniform Commercial Code
and, during arguments about the admissibility of certain exhibits,
the attorney for Herm Hughes stated:
MR. WEEKS:
I think Mr. Lambert has — has
tried to focus on the fact the we've got to
have a written agreement here or we can't have
an agreement. There is nothing in the statute
of frauds that says you can't have an oral
agreement and show us in part performance, the
very exception to the statute of frauds, to
get it out of the statue of frauds. We didn't
just sue on a written contract, we sued for
contract. And — and it would be very nice to
be able to say, let's pin down the exact
moment which a contract occurred.
T. 107.
*

*

*

*

I think it's an exception to the statue
of frauds, I don't think there's any question
about it, I think we have, in the course —
THE COURT:
On the basis of part performance, is that what you're claiming —
10

MR. WEEKS:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

That's the exception?

MR. WEEKS:
. . . And even absent the
written contract, we haven't sued on a written
contract, we've sued for contract, and we
believe that all of these exhibits show that
that contract existed.
I can't pin down the day the contract
existed. . .
T. 108-109.

(Emphasis added.)

Based on these comments and the absence of any reference at
trial by Herm Hughes to the Uniform Commercial Code, the court,
during closing argument by counsel for Herm Hughes, made the
following comments inviting Herm Hughes's counsel to address the
Commercial Code issues:
THE COURT:
. . . I hate to keep interrupting you here, but I think that the UCC is
going to come into play much more than either
of you have indicated to the Court before this
is through.
T. 177.
Despite this general reference to the UCC and the invitation
to address the issues, Herm Hughes' counsel continued to argue the
part performance exception and never addressed the issues relating
to § 70A-2-207 or waiver.
It is well established that failure to raise an issue at trial
precludes raising the issue on appeal.

As the Supreme Court of

Utah stated in Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P. 2d 938 (Utah 1987) , "We have
held that matters not raised at the trial court level will not be
considered by this Court on appeal, particularly when the problem
11

could have been resolved below."

Id. at 945.

See also Franklin

Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah
1983) .
As more particularly set forth in Point II herein, Quintek
believes that the trial court did consider all the pertinent
sections of the Commercial Code and that it correctly found under
the facts presented that no contract was ever formed and that no
waiver of the time requirements for acceptance accrued; however,
the court need not even consider these issues in light of the
failure on the part of Herm Hughes to even raise the issues at
trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS
NO AGREEMENT FORMED BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT IS
SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
A.

The courts' findings should be affirmed where they are

sustainable under any proper legal ground apparent from the record.
The court in Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah
1975) (citing Goodsell v. Department of Business Regulation, 523
P.2d 1230 (Utah 1974)), held in footnote number 3 that the judgment
under review should be affirmed if it is sustainable upon any
proper legal ground apparent from the record.

In Goodsell the

trial court had directed the Department of Business Regulation to
issue a certificate to a journeyman plumber holding that the
statute applied

in denying the license was unconstitutional.

Although the Supreme Court of Utah found that the trial court had
12

erred in holding the statute unconstitutional, they affirmed the
decision of the trial court on the grounds that the action of the
defendant was arbitrary, capricious and without foundation in fact
or law.

In Goodsell the court held in citing 5 C.J.S. Appeal and

Error § 1461(1) :
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial
court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this
is true even though such ground or theory is not urged
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the
lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the
lower court.
Id. at 1232.

See also Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc. , 657 P.2d

267, 276 (Utah 1982).
In the present case, it is clear that the ruling of the lower
court is sustainable under the Uniform Commercial Code legal theory
that there is not a contract where there was no "agreement.11

The

facts would support the court's ruling that there was no agreement.
Therefore, this court should affirm the lower court's holding where
it is sustainable upon a proper legal ground apparent from the
record.
It is the burden of the appellant, Herm Hughes, to marshal the
evidence which supports the court's findings and to demonstrate
why that evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact
made by the court.

As stated in General Glass Corp. v. Mast

Construction Co. , 766 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations
omitted):
As we have said on numerous occasions, in
order to challenge a finding of fact, it is an
13

appellant's burden to marshal all the evidence
that supports the court's finding and then
demonstrate, why, even viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below, it is
insufficient to support the finding made . .
. Only then can we consider whether these
findings are "clearly erroneous11 under Rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the present case, the appellant has utterly failed to even
attempt to meet this requirement.

The appellant has erroneously

characterized this appeal as simply being one where the conclusions
of law are to be reviewed for correctness.

Appellant's whole

argument hinges upon a position, not asserted at the trial level,
that appellee Quintek waived the ten-day acceptance requirement
stated in its "Cost Estimate".

Conduct rising to the level of

waiver is inherently a fact question, not a question of law.

Rees

v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 808 P. 2d 1069 (Utah 1991)

Such

a question is not to be reviewed for correctness, but is to be
reviewed under the standard as set forth in the above-cited General
Glass Corp. decision.

Herm Hughes' appeal, therefore, must fail

for having failed to meet this basic requirement concerning the
findings of the court below.

The mere fact that on the same

evidence an appellate court might have reached a different result
does not justify it in setting aside the finding as a finding is
"erroneous only if it is without evidentiary support."
Walker, 743 P. 2d 191, 193

State v.

(Utah 1987) (citing Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 2585

(1971)).

As stated

in

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), "Therefore,
our

review

is

strictly

limited

to whether

the

trial

court's

findings of fact support its conclusions of law and judgment."
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The court below certainly had evidence to find that while
Quintek

desired

to

contract

with

Herm

Hughes

and

engaged

in

negotiations, the discussions and conduct on the part of Quintek
were in the nature of negotiations for a potential contract and did
not constitute a waiver of the time within which Herm Hughes was
required to accept the "Cost Estimate".

On this basis alone, the

appeal of Herm Hughes must fail.
B.

Herm Hughes has not shown that the lower court applied

an erroneous standard of law on the issue of contract formation.
Quintek agrees that the Uniform Commercial Code sections that
refer to the sale of goods would be applicable in the present case
had Herm Hughes raised them in the lower court.

Quintek contends

that Herm Hughes has not shown that the court did not apply the
pertinent sections of the Uniform Commercial Code.

The court does

not specifically state in its findings what theories of law it
applied in reaching its decision.

It does not state that it was

applying the common law of contracts in reaching its decision.

It

does not mention the term "meeting of the minds" or any other term
that would indicate it was applying the common law doctrine.

Herm

Hughes has not shown that the court applied an incorrect legal
standard.
Contrary to Herm Hughes's claim it is apparent that the trial
court did apply the Uniform Commercial Code.

The trial court in

closing arguments specifically stated he believed that the UCC was
applicable.

(T. 177.) The trial court, in its findings, used the

term "agreement" in indicating that there was no agreement between
15

the parties. The term "agreement" is a defined term in the Uniform
Commercial Code. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204(l) provides in pertinent part:

"A contract for sale of goods may be made in any

manner sufficient to show agreement, . . . "

Under this section

an agreement is required to be found in order for a contract to be
formed.

It is apparent from the record that the court was applying

the Uniform Commercial Code in finding that there was no agreement
between the parties, and therefore did not err.
C.

The courts' finding that no agreement was formed

is

sustainable under the Uniform Commercial Code.
1.

The lower courts7

finding that no agreement was

formed is sustainable under Utah Code Ann. S 70A-2-204.
The Uniform

Commercial

Code, Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-2 04,

states that "a contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract."

The court

below found that there was no agreement between the parties, and
therefore no contract.
Under the facts of the present case, Quintek submitted the
"Cost Estimate" to Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. with the condition that
it be accepted within 10 days from the date of the estimate/bid.
The date of receipt of the "Cost Estimate" was October 27, 1983,
and therefore the cut-off date would have been November 5, 1983.
The court found that Herm Hughes did not in any manner accept
Quintek's "Cost Estimate" by November 5, 1983.

The findings of

fact of the court show that Herm Hughes never signed the "Cost
16

Estimate" of Quintek and did not even communicate with Quintek
until late November, 1983. Under the findings of fact No. 9 it has
been determined that the document which Herm Hughes now attempts
to characterize as an acceptance was received by Quintek on or
about November 30, 1983.
Although Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 does not require an offer
and acceptance in order to show agreement, Herm Hughes now claims
on appeal that this was the manner in which an agreement was made
and that there was an offer and an acceptance sufficient to show
agreement between the parties in the present case.

Herm Hughes

now claims on appeal that he accepted Quintek's offer by sending
Quintek a supplier agreement.

Herm Hughes claims that the "Sup-

plier Agreement" constituted a seasonable expression of an acceptance and relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(l) which states:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional
to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms.
The court in the present case found the alleged acceptance on the
part of Herm Hughes to be untimely because it was received after
the offer expired.

Where the offer in this case clearly expired

ten days after being submitted according to its terms and there was
no acceptance within that time period, there could not have been
a valid acceptance because the offer was no longer valid.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-2 05 states that: "an offer by a
merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing, which by its
17

terms gives assurance that it will be held open, is not revokable
for lack of consideration during the time stated, or if no time is
stated for a reasonable time." The Uniform Commercial Code section
cited above clearly indicates that an offer remains open for a
"reasonable time" only if a time period is not specified in the
offer.

The above section does not require that an offer be held

open beyond the time stated. In the present case, the offer was
automatically revoked after ten days according to its terms there
was no longer an offer open for Herm Hughes to accept.

Freedom of

contract is an express principle of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See Official Code Comment 2 to Uniform Commercial Code § 1-102.
It is axiomatic that parties are free to contract on their own
terms.

Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d

455

(Utah 1983).

Nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code has any effect to prevent
a party from limiting the time for acceptance of an offer.

The

court's finding that there was no agreement formed between the
parties,

and

therefore, no

contract

is

sustainable

under

the

Uniform Commercial Code.
Herm Hughes virtually
court

that

the

ignores the conclusion of the trial

"Supplier Agreement" was untimely

and

instead

focuses its argument on the effect of the differing terms of the
"Supplier Agreement" and the original offer document.

Where there

was not even an agreement formed for all the reasons stated in this
brief, the issue of differing terms never arises. The issue in the
present case is whether the supplier agreement

constituted

an

acceptance where it came after the expiration of acceptance period.
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Further, Herm Hughes incorrectly applies Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-207(1). The official comments to § 2-207 provide in part:
11

1.

This section is intended to deal with two typical situations.

The one is the written confirmation, . . . The other situation is
offer and acceptance, . . . Often the sellers form contains terms
different from or additional to those set forth in the buyer's
form.

Nevertheless the parties proceed with the transaction."

In the present case there was not an offer and an acceptance, and
the parties did not proceed with the transaction.

This section of

the Uniform Commercial Code was intended to clarify what terms
apply where the parties have proceeded and are arguing over the
terms of their agreement.

In the present case there was not a

valid acceptance, neither was there performance.
merely

The parties were

in the process of negotiating. Quintek denies that a

contract was ever formed.

This section does not apply in the

present case, because it was only intended to apply where both
parties have admitted a contract.

This section is based on the

assumption that it is admitted that there is a contract and the
controversy is only as to its terms. See Marlene Industries Corp.
v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 408 N.Y.S.2d 410, 380 N.E.2d 239 (1978).
The court in U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Semco Mfg. , Inc., 562 F.2d
1061, 1067 (1979)(citing R. Duesenberg & L. King Bender's Uniform
Commercial Code Service § 3.05, at 3-51 (1977); Duval & Co. v.
Mai com, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356

(1975)) stated that "an

^acceptance' is a prerequisite to the application of § 2-207 and
that only where all the traditional criteria of intent are met
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should Section 2-207 be applied; only then should the prescription
of Section 2-207 as to additional terms become relevant."

Utah

Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 does not apply in the present case.
2.

The alleged contract in the present case is not enforce-

able because it does not meet the requirements of the statute of
frauds applicable to the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial
Code.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(l) states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section,
a contract for the sale of goods for the price
of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there is some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and
signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.
The alleged contract in the present case must meet the
requirements of the above statute of frauds. The alleged contract
would have involved the sale of goods with a price in excess of
$500.00.

However, there was no writing in the present case

sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale had been made
between the parties.

The original offer document was not signed

by Herm Hughes and therefore did not constitute a sufficient
writing.

The document sent by Herm Hughes to Quintek was not

signed by Quintek nor did it indicate that a contract for sale had
been made.

Herm Hughes does not allege that there were any other

documents that constituted a contract.

Therefore, there is no

writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made between the parties and signed by Quintek.
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Herm Hughes's whole argument at trial was that partial performance would substitute for the requirements of subsection (1) which
requires a signed writing; however, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3)
outlines the only conditions upon which partial performance may
substitute for a signed writing as follows:
A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection (1) but which is valid in
other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specifically manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable
for sale to others in the ordinary course of
the seller's business and the seller, before
notice of repudiation is received and under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that
the goods are for the buyer, has made either
substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or
otherwise in court that a contract for sale
was made, but the contract is not enforceable
under this provision beyond the quantity of
goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment
has been made and accepted or which have been
received and accepted. (Section 70A-2-606.)
None of the requirements of Subsection (3) have been met by Herm
Hughes or Quintek sufficient to make the alleged contract enforceable as against the signed writing requirement.

Quintek, which

would have manufactured the goods under the alleged contract, is
not alleging that it substantially began the manufacture of the
goods or commitments for their procurement, nor does it admit that
a contract for sale was made.

Neither did Herm Hughes make any

payments, and no goods were delivered to Herm Hughes.
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The writings in the present case do not constitute a sufficient writing under the statute of frauds.

In order for a writing

to be sufficient to bind under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2201(2),

the writing

must

indicate

that

there

is

a

completed

transaction as to goods and state the quantity of goods.

See W.

H. Barber Co. v. MacNamera-Vivant Contracting Co., 293 N.W.2d 351
(Minn. 1979); Rockland Industries, Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Associates,
470 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979).

An original offer document was

submitted to Herm Hughes; however, a writing which is merely an
offer is not a sufficient writing under the statute of frauds, as
it does not indicate that there has been a completed transaction.
See Ellis v. Robbett Manufacturing Co. , 328 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D.
Ga.), aff'd, 445 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1970.)

Neither does a purchase

order of a buyer satisfy the statute of frauds as it does not show
that a contract has been made.

See Nations Enterprises, Inc. v.

Process Equipment Co. , 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d

655

(1970).

None of the writings in the present case indicated that there was
a completed transaction.
Where the requirements of the statute of frauds are not met,
the

alleged

defense.

contract

is not

enforceable

by way

of

action

or

Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974); Jurek

v. Thompson, 308 Minn. 191, 241 N.W. 2d 788 (1976).
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3.

The lower court's finding concerning bid shopping

by Herm Hughes justifies a conclusion that Ouintek/s original offer
was rejected and that Herm Hughes's "Supplier Agreement" was a new
offer which was rejected by Quintek.
The trial court made specific findings concerning bid shopping.

(Findings of Fact No. 8)

The court further found that

Quintek was advised of Herm Hughes's efforts to "shop" its bid.
These

facts

alone would

have

allowed

the

court

to

correctly

conclude that Quintek's bid was rejected and that, "viewing all of
the evidence together, this court

is unable to conclude that

plaintiff has established its case by a preponderance. . . . "

(R.

151)
POINT III
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE SUPPLIER AGREEMENT
WAS UNTIMELY AS AN ACCEPTANCE BECAUSE IT CAME AFTER
THE 10-DAY ACCEPTANCE PERIOD IN
QUINTEK'S "COST ESTIMATE".
"An offer for the sale of goods must be accepted within the
time specified by the offeror, . . .

If acceptance is not timely

made, there is by hypothesis no contract of sale."
Sales § 85.

67 Am. Jur. 2d

When an offer is made for a specified period of time,

it cannot be accepted after the lapse of that time."

Gilbert &

Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westincrhouse Electric Corp. , 445 F. Supp. 537
(1977).

There is nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code regulating

offers as such and, therefore, prior principles of contract law
continue

in force because not displaced.

See

§ 1-103;

2 R.

Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-206, at 258 (3rd Ed. 1982).
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The trial court held that Herm Hughes had not accepted the offer
of Quintek within the time specified by Quintek in his offer and,
therefore, there was no contract. Herm Hughes does not argue that
Quintek was not justified in including in his offer the acceptance
period or that Herm Hughes accepted within the time period allotted. The court was correct in holding that there was no contract
formed.
The trial court specifically concluded from the facts presented that there had been no waiver on the part of Quintek by its
continued efforts to pursue an agreement with Herm Hughes. (Conclusions of Law No.7) (R. 228)
Herm Hughes, however, claims that Quintek waived the acceptance period under the original offer and that the court erred in
holding that acceptance of the offer was untimely.

Herm Hughes

cites Swisher v. Clark. 209 P. 2d 880 (Okla. 1949) in asserting that
Quintek had waived the ten-day acceptance period.

In Swisher the

buyer presented a written offer to the seller to purchase land.
The offer expired by its terms at a certain time on a certain date.
The seller did not accept the offer by the expiration date.
buyer then approached

The

the seller after the expiration date,

presented the original offer document and requested that the seller
sign the original offer document.

The seller signed the original

offer document but later failed to convey the subject land.
buyer sued for specific performance.

The

The seller argued that

because the expiration date in the original offer document had
passed neither party was bound by the signed document.
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The court

in Swisher noted that the expiration date was put into the offer
document to protect the buyer and that the buyer had knowingly
waived the provision by her conduct. There are glaring differences
between the fact pattern in Swisher and the fact pattern in the
present case.

In the present case Quintek did not approach Herm

Hughes with the original offer document and request that Herm
Hughes sign it, and no documents were ever signed between the
parties as had been done in Swisher. The findings of the court in
the present case only show that Quintek received the "Supplier
Agreement," which was not the original offer document, from Herm
Hughes which Quintek subsequently refused to sign.
Second, the holding of the court in Swisher supports Quintets
case rather than Herm Hughes's case. The court held that where the
offer specifies a time of acceptance, acceptance after that time
will be nugatory as an acceptance, unless the offerer assents
thereto with full knowledge that it was not made within the period
named.

209 P.2d at 885.

Quintek in the present case has not

assented to an acceptance of the original offer document and
therefore has not waived the acceptance period.

In Swisher the

party who presented the offer acknowledged his waiver contrary to
the present case.

Swisher is therefore distinguishable from the

present case and does not present support for Herm Hughes in
alleging that Quintek waived the offer acceptance period.
Herm Hughes also cites B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v.
Collins Food Service, Inc.. 754 P. 2d 99 (Utah App. 1988) which
stated:
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Waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of
a known right." Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d at
123 0.
To waive a right there must be an
existing right, benefit, or advantage; knowledge of its existence; and an intention to
relinquish it. Id. The party's actions or
conduct must unequivocally evince an intent to
waive or must at least be inconsistent with
any other intent. Id.
In the present case there was no intention on the part of Quintek
to relinquish its right to revoke its offer which expired automatically after the ten-day acceptance period, nor was its conduct
inconsistent with any other intent.

Indeed, Quintek's conduct is

consistent with its intent to try to reach an agreement with Herm
Hughes regarding the trusses even though the original offer had
expired.

Quintek did not renew its original offer in any manner

or waive the ten-day acceptance period in any way.
Further, in the present case, if Quintek did approach Herm
Hughes to request a contract, it merely shows that Quintek was
willing to form a contract if the parties could reach an agreement
with terms that were satisfactory.

Even though Herm Hughes had

let the offer lapse, Quintek was still willing to try to reach an
agreement with Herm Hughes until it became apparent that an
agreement would not be reached.
Quintek was further justified in believing no agreement had
been reached in light of the facts which reveal that Herm Hughes
requested another company to lower its bid after the bids were
opened.

Herm Hughes did not notify Quintek if its bid had been or

would be accepted. Herm Hughes gave Quintek no indication whatsoever that it even possibly planned to contract with Quintek.
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Quintek had no way of knowing that Herm Hughes was even considering
contracting with Quintek.

Quintek had previously been informed by

another bidder that Herm Hughes had requested Oscar E. Chytraus
Co. to lower its bid and thought that Herm Hughes was bid shopping.
The findings do not show that Quintek presented its offer again or
requested Herm Hughes to sign the original offer document or that
Quintek even discussed the terms of the original offer.

They do

not show any behavior on the part of Quintek that would indicate
that it had waived the acceptance period on the original offer.
Further, Herm Hughes attempts to cloud the issue by citing
certain cases from other jurisdictions which hold that a document
is an acceptance even though it contains terms different from the
terms in the offer.

Herm Hughes ignores the fact that none of the

cases it cites are cases where the offer had already expired and
therefore acceptance was invalid as in the present case. The cases
cited are cases with fact patterns where the parties are arguing
over the terms of the contracts admittedly formed.

Specifically,

Herm Hughes cites Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Machinery Co. , 616 S.W.
2d 520 (Mo. App. 1981) ; Chicopee Concrete Service, Inc. v. Hart
Engineering Co., 479 N.E. 2d 748 (Mass. App. 1985); J. Baranello
& Sons v. Hausmann Industries, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).

In Boese-Hilburn Co., supra, the parties were arguing over

inconsistencies between the purchase order and the quotation which
constituted the offer and acceptance in that case, not over whether
an offer had expired or an acceptance period had been waived.
court's holdings are irrelevant to the present case.
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The

In Chicopee,

both parties added additional terms to the documents and signed and
delivered all documents.

Again the issue was not whether an offer

had expired but rather whether the differing terms of the documents
prevented a contract from being formed.

In the present case, the

parties signed no documents and came to no agreements.

In Bara-

nello, the court found that the documents exchanged demonstrated
an agreement on the essential terms of the parties' bargain, but
again the issue did not involve an expired offer acceptance period.
None of the cases cited

by Herm Hughes

are pertinent

to the

particular facts in the instant case, but rather address in general
terms the effect of differing terms between offers and acceptances.
The trial court was correct in holding there was no agreement
and the acceptance period had not been waived and therefore expired
according to its term on November 5, 1983.
correct

in holding

that the

"Supplier

The trial court was

Agreement"

received

by

Quintek in late November of 1983 did not constitute an acceptance
because it was untimely.

The trial court's decision should be

upheld where it is not incorrect.

Bricrham v. Moon Lake Elec.

Ass'n.. 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970).
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE CONDUCT
OP THE PARTIES DID NOT FORM AN AGREEMENT.
The conduct required to form a contract under Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-204 is conduct which "recognizes the existence of such
contract." Id.

The conduct of Quintek and Herm Hughes in the
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present case did not recognize the existence of a contract or an
agreement.

According to Finding of Fact 13 Quintek never began

fabrication of the trusses in question. After the "Cost Estimate"
was submitted to Herm Hughes by Quintek, Larry Gilson of Oscar E.
Chytraus Co., who had also submitted a "Cost Estimate" to Herm Hughes, contacted Boyd Jacobson of Quintek and advised him that he
had been contacted by Herm Hughes and had been requested to reduce
his bid, and in the opinion of Larry Gilson, Herm Hughes was bid
shopping.

(Finding of Fact No. 8.)

Herm Hughes, after contacting

Larry Gilson, did not sign a contract with either Quintek or Larry
Gilson, and the expected procedure was not followed in signing the
"Cost Estimate" of Quintek by the ten-day offer period.
Further, although the findings of the court indicate that a
supplier agreement was sent to Quintek, it was not received until
November 30, 1983, after the offer of Quintek had expired.

Even

after Quintek received the "Supplier Agreement," Quintek refused
to sign it.
Under the Findings of Fact, it is readily apparent that the
offer which was originally made by Quintek was never accepted in
any manner and that there was never an agreement formed between the
parties that Quintek would provide trusses. There was no contract
formed between the parties during that ten-day period, nor were
there any actions taken by either party during the ten-day period
to indicate performance in any manner under the offer.

The facts

show that a drawing was sent to Herm Hughes and various discussions
occurred relative to a possible contract for Quintek to fabricate
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the trusses in question.

However, none of the conduct of the

parties indicated that any agreement had been reached or that any
terms had been decided upon.
needed trusses.

Quintek was aware that Herm Hughes

Herm Hughes was aware from the "Cost Estimate"

that Quintek could provide trusses, but Quintek never agreed by its
conduct or otherwise that it would provide trusses for Herm Hughes.
The parties were merely in the process of trying to agree.

The

conduct of the parties did not rise to the level of recognizing the
existence of a contract.

The court was not incorrect in holding

that the conduct of the parties did not form an agreement.
POINT V
PUBLIC POLICY WOULD DISCOURAGE THE COURT FROM
FINDING THAT A CONTRACT HAD BEEN FORMED BETWEEN
THE PARTIES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE.
In the present case the conclusion that Herm Hughes controverts most is that its alleged acceptance was untimely because
it came after the expiration of the 10-day acceptance period. If
the court were to determine that Quintek was to be held to the
prices quoted in his original offer document although the offer
expired according to its terms after 10 days and where Quintek
never intended to waive the acceptance period, it would have the
effect of invalidating written acceptance periods where the subject
of the contract dictates that a limited time for acceptance is
necessary, i.e., commodities. The purpose of the acceptance period
in a "Cost Estimate" to construct certain goods is for the protection of the bidder.
upon his cost.

The bidder will quote a price that is based

In the present case, the bid was based upon the
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cost of the materials necessary for the construction of the
product.

The bidders' estimate of the cost of materials is often

based upon a quote that is also available for a certain time
period.

The cost of the lumber and other commodities in a supply

and demand economy may vary in a short time period. A bidder would
take a substantial loss if he were to be held to an offer price
based upon a low material price that had risen before he could
contract for the materials because he was waiting for an acceptance
of his offer.

The acceptance period in a contract is usually the

same period for which the producer believes he can obtain the
underlying materials at a given price.

Suppliers may have other

legitimate reasons for limiting the period for acceptance of a
"Cost Estimate", i.e., the need to know whether contract commitments will exceed production capacity within time requirements.
Had Herm Hughes wanted to form a contract with Quintek or be
assured it could obtain the price quoted in the original offer
document it very easily could have followed the expected procedure
of signing the "Cost Estimate" of Quintek within the 10-day
acceptance period or even presenting the supplier agreement within
the 10-day acceptance period or indicated in any other manner that
he accepted the offer so that Quintek could obtain the underlying
materials at its expected price. Even after the ten-day acceptance
period had Herm Hughes wanted to accept Quintek's offer, Herm
Hughes could have established its intent to accept the original
terms by indicating to Quintek that it wished to do so or signed
a contract with Quintek and perhaps Quintek would have considered
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waiving the ten-day acceptance period and formed a contract if it
could still obtain the materials at expected cost.

Rather it

appears that Herm Hughes still hoped to form an agreement more
favorable than the terms of the offer it had originally received,
and it did not form an agreement with Quintek to provide the
trusses.
Further, if Quintek in the present case were to be held to
have formed a contract even though no agreement was ever reached
or no contract of any kind ever signed, the message to the public
would be that once an offer is made you can be held accountable for
the terms of that offer even if it is not accepted and even if the
acceptance period has expired.

A producer could not be sure that

he would not take a loss once he had made an offer with a quoted
price based on the underlying market cost of materials. If Quintek
were to be held to the prices originally offered without the
assurance that the underlying material prices would remain fixed
at the level relied on by Quintek in making the offer, it would be
entirely inequitable to Quintek.

Further, buyers under the "Cost

Estimate" system would be free to bid shop and take advantage of
offers that had been made during a time when materials could be
obtained at a low price while they also waited to see if prices
would fall and perhaps receive a lower bid from another party. Herm
Hughes in this case did not have clean hands as evidenced by its
bid shopping.

For the court to now hold Quintek to prices quoted

in the original offer document would be to encourage others to deal
in such a manner.
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The intended purpose of the sections of the Uniform Commercial
Code cited was to clarify terms of contracts where the terms of the
offer and acceptance differed but where the parties had proceeded
with the performance of the contract anyway.

The intended purpose

of the sections was not to imply a contract between parties where
no agreement was actually reached by the parties.
POINT VI
QUINTEK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
PURSUANT TO RULE 33(a), UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
In the present case, the critical issues are those concerning
waiver and course of conduct allegedly creating a contract, which
are fact questions subject to review for sufficiency of evidence.
The appellant, Herm Hughes, did not even acknowledge this standard
of review for these fact questions. Instead, the appellant devoted
the bulk of its brief to discussion of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207,
a statute which appellant never cited or argued at trial. Appellee
respectfully

submits

that

the appeal

herein

is

frivolous

and

subject to an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
33(a).

As this court has stated, sanctions should be imposed when

an appeal is obviously without any merit and has been taken without
reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365

(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Mauahn v. Maughn. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly found that there is no agreement
formed between the parties and therefore no contract.
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The trial

court correctly determined that the "Supplier Agreement" sent by
the plaintiff was untimely because it came after the 10 day
acceptance period as set forth in Quintet/s "Cost Estimate," that
this 10 day acceptance period was not waived by Quintek, and that
thereafter the conduct of the parties did not form an agreement or
a contract.
The alleged contract in the present case was for the sale of
goods and the Uniform Commercial Code presents guidance for this
case. The Court7s decision below is sustainable under the Uniform
Commercial Code and therefore should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of August, 1991.

DAVZt) LAMBERT/and
DANIELLE M. FERRDN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS &JpETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellee Quintek
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 7th
day of August, 1991.
Clark B. Fetzer, Esq.
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson
700 Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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APPENDIX "A"
Cost Estimate

Pit txnibit

P.O. Box 76, Provo, Utah 8460i
(801)377-0907 -(UmH*)5-9G7&.
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TOTAL AMOUNT.
We agree to furnish all above items for the sum of ~><^r &zx?tf5
provided this esfrpsiate is accepted within
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days from above date
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DATE.
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APPENDIX "B"
Supplier Agreement

HERM HUGHES & SONS INC.

GENERAL CONTRACTORS

P.O. Box 256
Phone (801) 292-1411

1650 West 500 South
West Bountiful, Utah 84087

November 21, 1983

P!fExhibit

Quintek
P. 0. Box 76
Provo, Utah 84601
RE:
MIDLAND ELEMENTARY SCHOOL / Roy, Utah

^«
^
V&ysY

Gentlemen:
We are enclosing two copies of the agreement for the above
project. Please sign and return
one copy to our office as
soon as possible.
Please prepare your monthly estimates as follows:
1. Submit invoices to our office no later than
the 15th of the month.
2. Contract amount:
% work completed to date
less 10% retainage
Amount earned to date
Less previous payments^
Net due this estimate
3. Shop drawings and/or color samples must be in our
office within two weeks of the date of this letter
so that we can forward them to the Architect for
approval .
Sincerely,
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC.

Todd Walker
Project Manager

This AGREEMENT made this
J5_th_ day of N o v e m b e r in t h e y e a r of N i n e t e e n H u n d r e d
and E i g h t y T h r e e by and b e t w e e n H E R M HUTTOT5 ~l _S ON S_
INC^, h e r e i na f t er c a l l e d t h e
C o n t r a c t o r and QJJINTEK
h e r e ! naf te"r" c a T T e cT^tHe " S u p p W r for t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of
M i 2 L A N D _ E L E M E N T A 5 Y ^ T T J 5 0 L for W E B E R _ S C H O O L _ D J ^ S T R ^ C T
h e r e i n a f t e r called the O w n e r .
W I T N E S S E T H , that the S u p p l i e r
a g r e e as f o i l o w s :

and C o n t r a c t o r

for

consideration

hereinafter

named

S E C T I O N 1.
It is a g r e e d t h a t t h e S u p p l i e r shall be b o u n d to t h e C o n t r a c t o r
by t h e t e r m s of t h e C e n e r a l C o n t r a c t , t h e G e n e r a l C o n d i t i o n s , S p e c i a l C o n d i t i o n s ,
D r a w i n g s , A d d e n d u m 1 and S p e c i f i c a t i o n s for M I D L A N D E L E M E N T A R Y .
He s h a l l
assume
t o w a r d t h e C o n t r a c t o r all o b l i g a t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h a t t h e C o n t r a c t o r , by
these d o c u m e n t s , assumes toward the O w n e r , a l t h o u g h the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d
Contract
D o c u m e n t s a r e not a t t a c h e d h e r e t o , t h e y shall b e c o m e a p a r t of t h i s A g r e e m e n t .
It
is a s s u m e d , that t h e S u p p l i e r is f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e t e r m s a n d r e q u i r e m e n t s set
forth therein.
SECTION

2.

It is a g r e e d

that

the m a t e r i a l s

to b e f u r n i s h e d

FOB j o b s i t e

are:

As set f o r t h in t h e G e n e r a l C o n d i t i o n s and G e n e r a l R e q u i r e m e n t s , D i v i s i o n 1 a n d
D i v i s i o n 6, W O O D 4 P L A S T I C , S e c t i o n 6 0 1 0 - L u m b e r & r e l a t e d i t e m s as it p e r t a i n s to
w o o d t r u s s e s a l o n g w i t h A d d e n d u m 1 of t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s a n d as i n d i c a t e d on t h e
d r a w i n g s of J 0 H N _ U . _ F M E R S _ A ^ A .
I n c l u d i n g but n o t l i m i t e d t o :
1. All p r e f a b r i c a t e d
approved shop.

metal

plate

2 . S u b m i t six ( 6 ) c o p i e s s h o p
s t a m p to o u r o f f i c e w i t h i n
FOB j o b s i t e

address

wood

trusses

manufactured

drawings with registered
two (2) w e e k s .

as f o l l o w s : 4 8 0 0

South

3100 West

in an

structural

I.C.B.O.
engineer

/ Roy, Utah

S E C T I O N 3.
It is a g r e e d t h a t t h e C o n t r a c t o r shall pay to t h e S u p p l i e r for
the s a t i s f a c t o r y
completion
of all m a t e r i a l s
furnished
t h e sum of F O R T Y T W O
T H O U S A N D ^ FJ VJ_JiWJ)J*EJ)_E_l_CH^
<LVLUL_i*lf:J. 118 • 0 0 2
i nc 1 u dTnlfTTT
s ^ a t e a"~ncT T o c a T sal el and" u s e t a x e s fn m o n t F T y p a y m e n t s o f 9 0 $ of t h e m a t e r i a l s
f u r n i s h e d in any p r e c e d i n g m o n t h , in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h e s t i m a t e s p r e p a r e d by t h e
S u p p l i e r and as a p p r o v e d by t h e C o n t r a c t o r , H E R M H U G H E S & S O N S , I N C , t h e a r c h i t e c t
and O w n e r ; such p a y m e n t s to be m a d e as p a y m e n t s a r e r e c e i v e d by t h e C o n t r a c t o r
f r o m t h e O w n e r c o v e r i n g t h e m o n t h l y e s t i m a t e s of t h e C o n t r a c t o r , i n c l u d i n g the
a p p r o v e d p o r t i o n of t h e S u p p l i e r ' s m o n t h l y e s t i m a t e as o u t l i n e d in t h e G e n e r a l
C o n d i t i o n s of t h e c o n t r a c t .
Final p a y m e n t to be m a d e as s u c h p a y m e n t is r e c e i v e d
by
the Contractor
from
the O w n e r .
Supplier
shall
provide
appropriate
lien
r e l e a s e s as r e q u i r e d by t h e c o n t r a c t o r .
S E C T I O N <•. T h e S u p p l i e r a g r e e s to r e i m b u r s e t h e C o n t r a c t o r for any and all
l i q u i d a t e d d a m a g e s t h a t m a y be a s s e s s e d a g a i n s t and c o l l e c t e d f r o m t h e C o n t r a c t o r
by t h e O w n e r , w h i c h a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e to or c a u s e d by t h e S u p p l i e r ' s f a i l u r e to
f u r n i s h t h e m a t e r i a l s and p e r f o r m t h e w o r k r e q u i r e d by t h i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n t h e
t i m e f i x e d in t h e m a n n e r p r o v i d e d for h e r e i n .
T h e S u p p l i e r a l s o a g r e e s to pay to
t h e C o n t r a c t o r s u c h o t h e r or a d d i t i o n a l d a m a g e s as t h e C o n t r a c t o r m a y s u s t a i n by
r e a s o n of s u c h d e l a y by t h e S u p p l i e r .
T h e p a y m e n t of s u c h d a m a g e s shall not
r e l e a s e t h e S u p p l i e r f r o m h i s o b l i g a t i o n to o t h e r w i s e f u l l y p e r f o r m t h i s S u p p l i e r
Agreement.
In t h e e v e n t of a d i s p u t e or d e l a y , C o n t r a c t o r
h a s t h e r i g h t to
p r o v i d e t h e m a t e r i a l and a d j u s t t h e c o n t r a c t p r i c e a c c o r d i n g l y .
Supplier
shall
a l s o pay r e a s o n a b l e legal f e e s n e c e s s a r y for t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of t h i s a g r e e m e n t .
S E C T I O N 5.
It 1s a g r e e d t h a t t h e S u p p l i e r shall be r e s p o n s i b l e to p r e p a r e
and to o b t a i n a p p r o v a l of all n e c e s s a r y s h o p d r a w i n g s as to n o t c a u s e d e l a y in t h e
p r o g r e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e s u b j e c t p r o j e c t .
S E C T I O N 6.
a c c u r a c y of t h e i r

It is a g r e e d
shop d r a w i n g s

that: t h e S u p p l i e r
s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e
for
to c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e A r c h i t e c t ' s d r a w i n g s .

SECTION 7.
In l i e u of r e t a i n a g e r e q u i r e d by t h e C o n t r a c t o r ,
to a l l o w a d i s c o u n t of 8 % t e n d a y s to t h e C o n t r a c t o r .
IN W I T N E S S W H E R E O F t h e p a r t i e s
year first above w r i t t e n .

hereto

have

executed

this

Agreement,

CONTRACTOR:

SUPPLIER:

HERM H U G H E S A ^ S O N S ^ INC.
1 6 5 0 W e s t 5C
* U — B o u n t i f utf,H*tah|/8J»0.87

OUINTEK
P. 0 . B o x 7 6
P r o v o , Utah 84601

By:

,

5ecre"£a"7y7Treasurer

Supplier
the

the

agrees
day

and

APPENDIX "C"
Proposed Supplier Agreement

PIS &xfci'cit

/f

PROPOSAL

2?5

SUPPLIER AGREEMENT

-/

'.O.Box 76, Provo, Utah, 84601

This AGREEMENT made this 22nd day of Febuary 1984 by and between
Henri Hughes & Sons, Inc. heeinafter called the owner and Quintex Inc.
hereinafter called the Supplier.
Witnesseth, that the supplier and the contractor for consideration hereinafter
named agress as follows:
Section 1. It is agreed that the materials to be furnished FOB jobsite on the
truck.
As set forth in the general conditions and general requirements, Divisions
1 and Division 6, WOOD & PLASTIC, Section 6010-lumber & related items as it
pertains to wood trusses along with the specifications and as indicated on
the drawings of John L. Piers AIA^
1. all prefabricated metal plate wood trusses manfactured in an
I.B.C.O. approved shop.
2. submit six (6) copies shop dreawing with a registered civil
engineer stamp to Herm Hughes & Sons within two (2) weeks of receipt
of supplier agreement.
FOB JOBSITE ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: 4800 South 3100 West Roy, Utah
Section 2. It is agreed that the contractor shall pay to the supplier
for the satisfoctory completion of all materials furnished the sum of Fourty
Eight Thousand and no cents (48,000.00),tax not included FOB jobsite on the truck.
Supplier agress to allow a discount of eight (8) percent, net ten (10) days,
fron invoice date. The date of invoice shall be the completion date pf fabrication.
The creation of a new supplier's agreement is made necessary for the following
reasons: (1) Bid date was October 25,1983. Unforseen delays to both the
contractor and all the suppliers have made accepted the bid prices untenable.
(2) lyiaterials cost have risen dramatically from the bid date of four months ago.
(3) Production scheduling for fabrication is becoming questionable.
Approaching the busiest production time period of the entire year will
necessitate increased production costs for a project which should have already
been fabricated and delivered.
(4) Contractor also agrees to condition of sale clause on the Quintek invoice.

CONTRACTOR:

SUPPLIER:
QUINTFK INC.

By_

P~J&-<&

APPENDIX "D"
Ruling

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
HERB HUGHES & SONS, INC.,
A Utah Corporation
Plaintiff,
vs

R U L I N G
Case No. 883000004

QUINTEK, A Utah Corporation

Plaintiff was the general contractor on a school building
project, and defendant a manufacturer and supplier of roof trusses
who provided plaintiff with a written cost estimate for supplying
trusses for the project. That cost estimate contained a provision
that it be accepted within 10 days of its date, and also contained a
blank space for such acceptance to be endorsed therin with the date.
The written cost estimate was never accepted by any endorsement
theron by plaintiff or its agents. A suppliers agreement bearing
date of November 15, 1983, appears to have been submitted to
defendant by plaintiff sometime near the end of that month, but
defendant found its terms unacceptable and so advised plaintiff. The
project went forward with plaintiff believing it had a firm agreement
for the trusses, and defendant protesting that it could not proceed
with the ordering of materials and the manufacturing of the trusses
until it had an acceptance of its cost estimate as submitted. It
appears that each party persisted in its own position, with some
exchanges between them, until February, 1984, when defendant refused
to proceed further. This action was filed in August 1984, and has
been languishing in the district court and then the circuit court
ever since.
Plaintiff•scontentions seems to be that even if no acceptance was
endorsed on defendant's cost estimate, the ensuing conduct and course
of dealing between the parties showed an acceptance and binding
agreement between them.
The written documents submitted as evidence, mostly generated
by the plaintiff, can be viewed as supporting plaintiffs position;
but much of the oral testimony received by the court tends to offer
plausible explanations for the course of dealing between the
parties. Obviously, the passage of over six years since these events
took place causes additional problems. The one fact that comes
through this haze is that the original cost estimate had no
acceptance endorsed on it within the ten days required by its terms,
and there is no document showing acceptance wVi^in$^hat period of
time. Certainly plaintiff could^B^^asily met the conditions
requested and avoided all the problems which have ensued.

Viewing all of the evidence together, this court is unable to
conclude that plaintiff has established its case by a preponderance
thereof- Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffs claim
should be dismissed.
Dated:

September 10, 1990

,v
Robert J. Sumsion
Circuit Court Judge

I hereby certify that a true and correct copies of the foregoing
Ruling ws mailed, postage prepaid, on this 14th day of September,
1990 to the following parties.
E. Nordell Weeks, Esq, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 320 Kearns
Building, 136 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David Lambert, Attorney for the Defense, P O BOX 778, Provo, UT
84603
Kristine Christianson
Circuit Court Clerk

APPENDIX M E M
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

D, DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Prquin-fof.lo
Our File No. 15,669

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 883000004

Defendant.
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th day
of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president,
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks.
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its
attorney, D. David Lambert. The Court received the evidence of the parties and has considered
the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and now makes the
following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff corporation is a general contractor doing business within the

State of Utah.
2.

The defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of manufacturing roof

trusses and other building components which are supplied as finished products without doing
work on the job site.
3.

In late October, 1983, the defendant became aware of the possibility of bidding

on the Midland Elementary School to be constructed in Roy, Utah. This information came
through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service, and an agent of the defendant corporation
reviewed the materials available through the service. Defendant prepared an estimate of its cost
to provide roof trusses for the school in question.
4.

On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to plaintiff by telephone a bid

proposal which had been reduced to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same day that
the verbal communication took place.
5.

Plaintiff received the defendant's written bid proposal on October 27, 1983,

as indicated by its date stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the Court as
Exhibit 6.
6.

Defendant's written bid proposal, (Exhibit 6) specified that the offer was to be

accepted within ten days and provided a space at the bottom of the written document for
plaintiff to sign in acceptance.
7.

Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the defendant and did not

communicate with defendant until late November, 1983.
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8.

Larry Gilson, of Oscar E. Chytraus Co., prepared and submitted to plaintiff

a bid for the trusses which are the subject of the plaintiffs claims. After the bid openings he
was asked by plaintiff to meet and Mr. Gilson attended a meeting at the plaintiffs office.
During that meeting Mr. Gilson was asked by plaintiff to reduce his bid proposal. After the
meeting, Larry Gilson contacted defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, and advised Mr.
Jacobson that in his opinion plaintiff was bid shopping the Quintek bid.
9.

The only written response of the plaintiff which directiy addressed the terms

of the bid proposal was made under cover letter dated November 21, 1983, and was in the form
of a Supplier Agreement. The cover letter and Supplier Agreement were received by the Court
as Exhibit 11. Exhibit 20, containing the notes of Don Brown, an employee of the defendant,
gives reason to believe that Exhibit 11 was received by the defendant on or about November
30, 1983.
10.

Defendant refused to sign the Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) and shortly after

receiving the supplier agreement, defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had discussions with
Todd Walker, an employee of the plaintiff, stating his refusal to sign the Supplier Agreement.
11.

The Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) contains various terms which are different

than the defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), including the following terms:
a.

Specific terms concerning indemnification;

b.

Specific terms about assuming direct obligations to the owner;

c.

Language allowing the contractor to retain 10% of the purchase price

until completion of the project; and
d.

Provisions concerning liquidated damages.
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12.

Certain shop drawings were done preliminary to defendant's submission of

the bid proposal to the plaintiff. It is unclear if those same drawings were later submitted to
plaintiff, but a drawing (Exhibit 13) was sent and discussions occurred relative to possible
performance by defendant in fabricating the trusses in question.
13.

Defendant never began fabrication of the trusses and never produced any of

the trusses for the school in question.
The Court having made the above Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff failed to carry its burden to establish that there was an agreement

between the parties.
2.

Plaintiffs Supplier Agreement was belated and untimely and did not create a

contract.
3.

Plaintiffs conduct concerning the Oscar Chytraus bid was communicated to

the defendant and made the defendant justifiably suspicious about the plaintiffs intentions. This
fact, coupled with the failure of the plaintiff to act in a timely manner to confirm an agreement
convinced the court that an agreement between the parties was never concluded.
4.

Defendant acted promptly and reasonably to notify the plaintiff that it rejected

the terms proposed in the supplier agreement.
5.

No partial performance occurred in that no aspect of the final product to be

supplied was ever fabricated, no step of fabrication, except a preliminary drawing, was ever
commenced, plaintiff never accepted or received any goods and plaintiff paid no monies to
defendant.
4

6.

The supplier agreement sent to defendant by the plaintiff, in addition to being

untimely, was materially different than defendant's original proposal.
7.

Defendant's efforts to pursue an agreement with the plaintiff after its offer

expired does not constitute a waiver or otherwise convince the court that an agreement was ever
reached.
8.

Plaintiff alleged only a cause of action for breach of contract and no estoppel

or reliance claims were pleaded or proven.
9.

Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice with costs to defendant.

DATED this O

x

day of December, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

*

vv

^

\

^i^^S^C^JSh.
ROBERT^ SUASION ' '•%,.,
CIRCUIT B ^ ^ R T ^ U B ^ | . o ^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

/ ( / day of December, 1990.

Clark B.Fetzer, Esq.
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson
175 South Main Street
700 Walker Center
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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APPENDIX "F"
Judgment

F ! L E D JAN - 3 1991
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

P:quinjud.jh
Our File No. 15,669

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 883000004

Defendant.
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th day
of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president,
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks.
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its
attorney, D. David Lambert. The Court having received the evidence of the parties, having
considered the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and having
previously made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

There was never any meeting of the minds or agreement between the parties.

2.

The plaintiffs case is dismissed with prejudice.

3.

Defendant is awarded costs in the sum of $125.60.

DATED this

o

day of Becember, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

ROBERT/^' SUMSION ^
CIRCUTKCOURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

ID

day of December, 1990.

Clark B. Fetzer, Esq.
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson
700 Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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APPENDIX "G"
Determinative Statutes
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

70A-2-206. Offer and acceptance in formation of
contract.
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by
the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and
by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise
to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of
nonconforming goods, but such a shipment of
nonconforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an
accommodation to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror
who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable
time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.
1965
70A-2-207. Additional terms in acceptance or
confirmation.
( D A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as prop o s e s for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the
terms of the offer,
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable
time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms
on which the writings of the parties agree, together
with any supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of this act.
19*5
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical
construction.
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated
occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of
the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any
such course of performance, as well as any course of
dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable, express
terms shall control course of performance and course
of performance shall control both course of dealing
and usage of trade (Section 70A-1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on
modification and waiver, such course of performance
shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of
any term inconsistent with such course of performance.
1945
70A-2-209.

Modification, rescission and waiver.

70A-2-302

(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this
chapter needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be
otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by
the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this chapter (Section 70A-2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection
(2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an
executory portion of the contract may retract the
waiver by reasonable notification received by the
other party that strict performance will be required of
any term waived, unless the retraction would be
unjust in view of a material change of position in
reliance on the waiver.
1965
70A-2-210. Delegation of performance — Assignment of rights.
( 1 ) A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other
party has a substantial interest in having his original
promisor perform or control the acts required by the
contract. No delegation of performance relieves the
party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either
seller or buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the
other party, or increase materially the burden or risk
imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially
his chance of obtaining return performance. A right
to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right
arising out of the assignor's due performance of his
entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement
otherwise.
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary
a prohibition of assignment of "the contract" is to be
construed as barring only the delegation of (to) the
assignee of the assignor's performance.
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my
rights under the contract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an assignment of rights and unless the language or the circumstances (as in an assignment of (for) security) indicate the contrary, it is
a delegation of performance of the duties of the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes
a promise by him to perform those duties. This promise is enforceable by either the assignor or the other
party to the original contract.
(5) The other party may treat any assignment
which delegates performance as creating reasonable
grounds for insecurity and may without prejudice to
his rights against the assignor demand assurances
from the assignee (Section 70A-2-609).
1965
PART 3
GENERAL OBLIGATION A N D
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT
70A-2-301. General obligations of parties.
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in
accordance with the contract.
1965
70A-2-302. U n c o n s c i o n a b l e contract or clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
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70A-2-107

those relating to the present or future sale of goods
"Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time A
"sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401) A "present
sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are "conforming" or conform to the contract
when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts an
end to the contract otherwise than for its breach On
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right based
on prior breach or performance survives
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts
an end to the contract for breach by the other and its
effect is the same as that of "termination" except that
the canceling party also retains any remedy for
breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance
1965
70A-2-107. Goods to be severed from realty —
Recording.
( 1 ) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like
including oil or gas) or a structure or its materials to
>e removed from realty is a contract for the sale of
foods within this chapter if they are to be severed by
he seller but until severance a purported present
ale thereof which is not effective as a transfer of an
riterest in land is effective only as a contract to sell
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of
rowing crops or other things attached to realty and
apable of severance without material harm thereto
ut not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be
at is a contract for the sale of goods within this chapsr whether the subject matter is to be severed by the
uyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the
ealty at the time of contracting, and the parties can
y identification effect a present sale before severnce
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any
urd party rights provided by the law relating to reIty records, and the contract for sale may be exelted and recorded as a document transferring an
tterest j n land and shall -then constitute notice to
urd parties of the buyer's rights under the contract
raale
1977
PART 2

ORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT
OF CONTRACT
lA-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of
frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a
ntract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or
Dre is not enforceable by way of action or defense
less there is some writing sufficient to indicate
at a contract for sale has been made between the
rties and signed by the party against whom encement is sought or by his authorized agent or bror A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
correctly states a term agreed upon but the contract
not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the
antity of goods shown in such writing
2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time
vntmg in confirmation of the contract and suffint against the sender is received and the party
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receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of Subsection (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to its contents
is given within ten days after it is received
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection (1) but which is valid in other
respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale
to others m the ordinary course of the seller's
business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the goods are for the
buyer, has made either a substantial beginning
of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement, or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made,
but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted, or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment
has been made and accepted or which have been
received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606)
1965
70A-2-202. Final written expression — Parol or
extrinsic evidence.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory
memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as
a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained
or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 70A- L-205) or by course of performance (Section 70A-2-208), and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the court finds the writing to have been
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement
1985
70A-2-203. Seals inoperative.
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a
contract for sale or an offer to buy or sell goods does
not constitute the writing a sealed instrument and
the law with respect to sealed instruments does not
apply to such a contract or offer
1965
70A-2-2O4. Formation in general.
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any
manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract
for sale may be found even though the moment of its
making is undetermined
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a
contract for sale does not fail for lndefimteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy
1965
70A-2-205. Firm offers.
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance
that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is
stated for a reasonable time, but m no event may
such period of irrevocability exceed three months, but
any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the
offeree must be separately signed by the offeror 1965

